Work

Robust equilibria in cheap-talk games with fairly transparent motives

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: Equilibria of cheap-talk games in which the sender has state-independent preferences are generally not robust to introducing slight dependence on the state. Some equilibria, however, can be approximated by robust equilibria of nearby cheap-talk games with slightly state-dependent sender preferences. We characterize these equilibria for all games with binary state space and show that, in particular, the maximal equilibrium payoff for the sender can always be robustly approximated in this sense.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.104076

Authors: Jan-Henrik Steg, Elshan Garashli, Michael Greinecker, Christoph Kuzmics

Institutions: Bielefeld University, University of Graz, École Normale Supérieure - PSL, Centre for Economics at Paris-Saclay

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,720

Funders: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Austrian Science Fund, Oesterreichische Nationalbank