Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: C oalition presidentialism has revealed itself to be one of the most instigating ways of forming a government.Its recurrence has introduced new challenges in the study of relations between the Executive and Legislative branches, gradually displacing the focus to the decision-making process and the micro-institutions that regulate it.This analytical trend has given rise to a considerable number of studies on the dynamics of the aforesaid relations, which have gradually provided readers with a more thorough picture of the political and institutional bases for this type of government.The contributions found in the book Política orçamentária no presidencialismo de coalizão should be regarded as being part of this context.In its Introduction, the authors reiterate the continuity between this work and their previous study: Executivo e Legislativo na nova ordem constitucional.However, far from being a mere update, they warn readers about what is going to surprise them up to the end of the book: a structured and detailed analysis of the mechanisms based on which coalition presidentialism actually takes shape as government practice.To this end, the book focuses on the budget policy decision-making cycle, which stretches from budget formulation to execution.The analysis of this policy is justified by more than its relevance.In fact, this issue has become a privileged object of various analyses that show that the distribution of budget resources is what "cements" relations between Executive and Legislative.
Author: Magna Inácio
Institution: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $456
OpenAlex ID: W4386832347