Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: This paper examines the position of ecumenical expressivism, a metaethical theory according to which moral judgments simultaneously express an individual?s sentiment of (dis)approval towards objects, actions, and practices instantiating certain properties, as well as their belief that these objects, actions, and practices instantiate the mentioned properties. After a detailed exposition of the central tenets of this philosophical position, we will analyze how successfully it can address the threat posed by the modified version of the open-question argument and whether it can resolve the famous Frege-Geach problem, which is rightly considered the most serious obstacle to adopting any form of expressivism. The conclusion of this analysis is that the claim that ecumenical expressivism can be considered a superior position compared to non-ecumenical forms of expressivist and cognitivist views is unjustified. This contrasts with the case of ecumenical cognitivism, where such a claim finds stronger support.
Source: Theoria Beograd
DOI: 10.2298/theo2303091m
Author: Voin Milevski
Institution: University of Belgrade
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4386973509