Year: 2023
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper examines the practice of piecemeal testing in psychological science. We appraise a recent line of argument against its use in practice based on the conclusions drawn from a thought experiment purporting to show that piecemeal testing, even when confirmatory, can reduce the scope of a scientific theory to the extent that it applies to no one at all. We show that the line of reasoning fails to mount a compelling case against piecemeal testing. In addition to being founded upon a naive and unworkable logico-mathematical conception of scientific theory, the argument effectively imposes a rigid idealization of uncertainty over statistical quantities, enforces an untenable relationship between prediction satisfaction and individual differences, and incorrectly treats instances where no prediction is made as predictive failures.
Language: English
Subfield: General Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W4387429086