Year: 2023
Type: preprint
Abstract: Equilibria in auctions can be very difficult to analyze, beyond the symmetric environments where revenue equivalence renders the analysis straightforward. This paper takes a robust approach to evaluating the equilibria of auctions. Rather than identify the equilibria of an auction under specific environmental conditions, it considers worst-case analysis, where an auction is evaluated according to the worst environment and worst equilibrium in that environment. It identifies a non-equilibrium property of auctions that governs whether or not their worst-case equilibria are good for welfare and revenue. This property is easy to analyze, can be refined from data, and composes across markets where multiple auctions are run simultaneously.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Authors: Hartline, Jason, Hoy, Darrell, Taggart, Samuel
Institutions: Northwestern University, Oberlin College
Language: English
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4387436638