Work

Incentives and Coevolution: Steering Linear Dynamical Systems With Noncooperative Agents

Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: Modern socio-technical systems typically consist of many interconnected users and competing service providers, where notions like market equilibrium are tightly connected to the “evolution” of the network of users. In this paper, we model the users' dynamics as a linear dynamical system, and the service providers as agents taking part to a generalized Nash game, whose outcome coincides with the input of the users' dynamics. We thus characterize the notion of co-evolution of the market and the network dynamics and derive dissipativity-based conditions leading to a pertinent notion of equilibrium. We then focus on the control design and adopt thelight-touchpolicy to incentivize or penalize the service providersas little as possible, while steering the networked system to a desirable outcome. We also provide a dimensionality-reduction procedure, which offers network-size independent conditions. Finally, we illustrate our novel notions and algorithms on a simulation setup stemming from digital market regulations for influencers, a topic of growing interest.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4388676541
FWCI: 0.738
Cites: 43
Cited by: 4
Related to: 10