Year: 2023
Type: article
Abstract: Psychology is a discipline that has a high number of failed replications, which has been characterized as a “crisis” on the assumption that failed replications are indicative of untrustworthy research. This article uses Chang’s concept of epistemic iteration to show how a research program can advance epistemic goals despite many failed replications. It illustrates this by analyzing an ongoing large-scale replication attempt of Southgate et al.’s work exploring infants’ understanding of false beliefs. It concludes that epistemic iteration offers a way of understanding the value of replications—both failed and successful—that contradicts the narrative centered around distrust.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1017/psa.2023.157
Author: Jane Suilin Lavelle
Institution: University of Edinburgh
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4388716787