Making Existing Quantum Position Verification Protocols Secure Against Arbitrary Transmission Loss
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Signal loss threatens the security of quantum cryptography, especially in quantum position verification (QPV) protocols, where even small losses can compromise security. This Letter modifies traditional QPV to make high transmission loss between verifiers and the prover irrelevant for a class of protocols, including a practically interesting one based on BB84 states (QPV_{BB84}^{f}). Using photon presence detection and a small time delay, as well as a commitment before proceeding, the protocol's relevant loss rate is reduced to only that of the prover's lab, and the modified protocol has essentially the same security guarantees as the original one. The adapted protocol c-QPV_{BB84}^{f} thus offers strong security guarantees and feasibility over longer distances. We also discuss the practical implementation of the protocol and parameter estimates.
Source: Physical Review Letters
DOI: 10.1103/szwj-s7r6
Authors: Rene Allerstorfer, Andreas Bluhm, Harry Buhrman, Matthias Christandl, Llorenç Escolà-Farràs, Florian Speelman, Philip Verduyn Lunel
Institutions: Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, QuSoft, Institut polytechnique de Grenoble, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble, Université Grenoble Alpes, Quantinuum (United Kingdom), Quantinuum (United States), University of Amsterdam, University of Copenhagen, Sorbonne Université, LIP6
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,750
Awards: G1190173965, Etude de la pile quantique : Algorithmes, modèles de calcul et simulation pour l’informatique quantique, Quantum Software Consortium, G3313451239, G4105022999, G420050720, G565383568, Systemes et Algorithmes Pervasifs au confluent des mondes physique et numérique, G6701137214, G7352392636
OpenAlex ID: W4390091716