Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that ontic structural realism is best understood not as a thesis or doctrine concerning how the world fundamentally is, but rather as a “stance” in the sense of van Fraassen (2002). I do so via an argument analogous to that which van Fraassen offers for why materialism should be regarded as a stance; namely, that by thinking of it as such we have a better explanation of the behavior of the putative doctrine’s adherents. In particular, I argue that thinking of structuralism as a stance best explains the toleration of disagreement within the structuralist community with respect to whether quantum fields ought to be classified as “objects” or “structures.” I close by offering a preliminary characterization of what the structuralist stance could consist in, arguing that it should be thought of as a sort of methodological orientation or injunction; namely, the injunction to foreground, when doing metaphysics, that the language of physics is mathematics.
Source: Philosophy of Physics
DOI: 10.31389/pop.77
Author: Kerry McKenzie
Institution: University of California San Diego
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4391326233