Work

Stealthy Backdoor Attack for Code Models

Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Code models, such as CodeBERT and CodeT5, offer general-purpose representations of code and play a vital role in supporting downstream automated software engineering tasks. Most recently, code models were revealed to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. A code model that is backdoor-attacked can behave normally on clean examples but will produce pre-defined malicious outputs on examples injected withtriggersthat activate the backdoors. Existing backdoor attacks on code models use unstealthy and easy-to-detect triggers. This paper aims to investigate the vulnerability of code models withstealthybackdoor attacks. To this end, we propose Afraidoor(AdversarialFeature asAdaptive Backdoor). Afraidoorachieves stealthiness by leveraging adversarial perturbations to inject adaptive triggers into different inputs. We apply Afraidoorto three widely adopted code models (CodeBERT, PLBART, and CodeT5) and two downstream tasks (code summarization and method name prediction). We evaluate three widely used defense methods and find that Afraidooris more unlikely to be detected by the defense methods than by baseline methods. More specifically, when using spectral signature as defense, around 85% of adaptive triggers in Afraidoorbypass the detection in the defense process. By contrast, only less than 12% of the triggers from previous work bypass the defense. When the defense method is not applied, both Afraidoorand baselines have almost perfect attack success rates. However, once a defense is applied, the attack success rates of baselines decrease dramatically, while the success rate of Afraidoorremains high. Our finding exposes security weaknesses in code models under stealthy backdoor attacks and shows that state-of-the-art defense methods cannot provide sufficient protection. We call for more research efforts in understanding security threats to code models and developing more effective countermeasures.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4391696889
FWCI: 9.677
Cites: 89
Cited by: 130
Related to: 10