Turnover: How Lame-Duck Governments Disrupt the Bureaucracy and Service Delivery before Leaving Office
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Electoral accountability is fundamental to representative democracy. Yet, it can also be costly for governance because it generates turnover among bureaucrats (not just politicians) and disrupts the delivery of public services. Previous studies on the connection between political and bureaucratic turnover emphasize how incoming governments reshape the bureaucracy. This article argues that election losers also engage in bureaucratic shuffling before leaving office, and that this can depress public service delivery. I employ a close-races regression discontinuity design to demonstrate these turnover dynamics, using administrative data on the universe of government employees and healthcare services in Brazilian municipalities. The results show that the incumbent’s electoral defeat causes dismissals of temporary employees, the hiring of more civil servants, and declines in healthcare service delivery before the winner takes office. These findings highlight the political strategies of lame-duck politicians and the consequential bureaucratic politics that follow elections.
Source: The Journal of Politics
DOI: 10.1086/729961
Author: Guillermo Toral
Institution: IE University
Language: English
Subfield: Public Administration
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4391874154