Work

Approval-based voting with mixed goods

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: We consider a voting scenario in which the resource to be voted upon may consist of both indivisible and divisible goods. This setting generalizes both the well-studied model of multiwinner voting and the recently introduced model of cake sharing. Under approval votes, we propose two variants of the extended justified representation (EJR) notion from multiwinner voting, a stronger one called EJR for mixed goods (EJR-M) and a weaker one called EJR up to 1 (EJR-1). We extend three multiwinner voting rules to our setting—GreedyEJR, the method of equal shares (MES), and proportional approval voting (PAV)—and show that while all three generalizations satisfy EJR-1, only the first one provides EJR-M. In addition, we derive tight bounds on the proportionality degree implied by EJR-M and EJR-1, and investigate the proportionality degree of our proposed rules.

Source: Social Choice and Welfare

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01511-8

Authors: Xinhang Lu, Jannik Peters, Haris Aziz, Xiaohui Bei, Warut Suksompong

Institutions: UNSW Sydney, Technische Universität Berlin, Nanyang Technological University, National University of Singapore

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,990