Work

Judge Ideology and Opportunistic Insider Trading

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: Although federal judges are the ultimate arbiters of insider trading enforcement, the role of their political ideology in insider trading is unclear. Using the partisanship of judges’ nominating presidents to measure judge ideology, we first document that liberal judges are associated with heavier penalties in insider trading lawsuits than conservative judges. Next, we find that firms located in circuits with more liberal judges have fewer opportunistic insider sales. Cross-sectional analyses show that this deterrent effect is stronger when managers face a higher risk of insider trading lawsuits. Finally, we find that the Securities and Exchange Commission considers judges’ ideology when selecting litigation forums.

Source: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

DOI: 10.1017/s0022109024000164

Authors: Allen H. Huang, Kai Wai Hui, Yue Zheng

Institutions: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, University of Hong Kong

Language: English

Topic: Financial Markets and Investment Strategies

Subfield: Finance

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,450