Work

Envy-free house allocation with minimum subsidy

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: House allocation refers to the problem where m houses are to be allocated to n agents so that each agent receives one house. Since an envy-free house allocation does not always exist, we consider finding such an allocation in the presence of subsidy. We show that computing an envy-free allocation with minimum subsidy is NP-hard in general, but can be done efficiently if m differs from n by an additive constant or if the agents have identical utilities.

Source: Operations Research Letters

DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2024.107103

Authors: Davin Choo, Yan Hao Ling, Warut Suksompong, Nicholas Teh, Jian Zhang

Institutions: National University of Singapore, University of Oxford

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,870