Work

Multirater Performance Evaluations and Incentives

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multi-rater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.

Source: Journal of Labor Economics

DOI: 10.1086/730321

Authors: Axel Ockenfels, Dirk Sliwka, Peter Werner

Institutions: University of Cologne, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Maastricht University

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: European Commission, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

Awards: G1346753722, G1378065188, EXC 2126: ECONtribute: Märkte & Public Policy, G5762555058