Work

Impartiality and relative utilitarianism

Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: A novel axiomatization of relative utilitarianism is provided using the single-profile setting used in Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem. Harsanyi’s axioms are supplemented with an impartiality axiom that requires social alternative lotteries p and q to be socially indifferent when (i) two individuals have conflicting preferences for them and everybody else is indifferent and (ii) the concerned individuals’ strengths of preference for p over q have the same magnitude. This axiomatization shows that equality of the social weights can be obtained in a single-profile setting and that no interprofile condition is needed to obtain profile-independent weights in a multi-profile setting.
Language: English
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,990
OpenAlex ID: W4393341653
FWCI: 2.233
Cites: 38
Cited by: 11
Related to: 10