Work

Shill-Proof Auctions

Year: 2024

Type: preprint

Abstract: We characterize single-item auction formats that are shill-proof in the sense that a profit-maximizing seller has no incentive to submit shill bids. We distinguish between strong shill-proofness, in which a seller with full knowledge of bidders' valuations can never profit from shilling, and weak shill-proofness, which requires only that the expected equilibrium profit from shilling is non-positive. The Dutch auction (with a suitable reserve) is the unique (revenue-)optimal and strongly shill-proof auction. Any deterministic auction can satisfy only two properties in the set {static, strategy-proof, weakly shill-proof}. Our main results extend to settings with affiliated and interdependent values.

Source: RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2404.00475

Authors: Komo, Andrew, Kominers, Scott Duke, Roughgarden, Tim

Institutions: Harvard University, Dana-Farber/Harvard Cancer Center, Columbia University

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: National Science Foundation, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, Division of Mathematical Sciences

Awards: Mathematical Sciences Research Institute (MSRI), G329468232, G4972001970, AF: Small: Beyond Worst-Case Analysis, G6019427330, Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Game Theory, Economics, and Mechanism Design for Blockchains, G7692653605, Research - Mathematical Sciences Research Institute (2021)

OpenAlex ID: W4393924167

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