Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Aristotle's doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues – like honesty, fair‐mindedness, and patience – are counterexamples to Aristotle's doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but taking it seriously also allows us to gain substantial insight into particular virtues. Failure to take the doctrine seriously, moreover, exposes us to the risk of mistaking certain vices for virtues.
Source: Pacific philosophical quarterly
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12457
Author: Nicholas Colgrove
Institution: Augusta University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: John Templeton Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W4394989520