Work

Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks Are Feasible in the Modern Public Cloud

Year: 2024

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: Last-level cache side-channel attacks have been mostly demonstrated in highly-controlled, quiescent local environments. Hence, it is unclear whether such attacks are feasible in a production cloud environment. In the cloud, side channels are flooded with noise from activities of other tenants and, in Function-as-a-Service (FaaS) workloads, the attacker has a very limited time window to mount the attack.

Source: ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems (ASPLOS)

DOI: 10.1145/3620665.3640403

Authors: Zirui Neil Zhao, Adam Morrison, Christopher W. Fletcher, Josep Torrellas

Institutions: University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Tel Aviv University

Language: English

Topic: Security and Verification in Computing

Subfield: Artificial Intelligence

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: green

Funders: National Science Foundation, Semiconductor Research Corporation, Intel Corporation, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Awards: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Collaborative: Hardening Off-the-Shelf Software Against Side Channel Attacks, CNS Core: Medium: Rethinking Architecture and Operating Systems for Modern Virtualization Technologies, Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Systematic Detection Of and Defenses Against Next-Generation Microarchitectural Attacks, CAREER: Fortifying Leaky Hardware Interfaces with Distinguishability Set Architectures, SHF: Medium: Cross-Cutting Effort to Make Non-Volatile Memories Truly Usable