Are there exclusionary reasons? An inquiry on a third kind of exclusionary reasons
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: : Joseph Raz became well-known for his concept of exclusionary reasons, which he applied in the analysis of various practical concepts, such as decisions, rules and obligations. However, the scholarly literature displays a high degree of skepticism regarding the existence of exclusionary reasons and even the coherence of the concept itself. Throughout his work, Raz consistently focused on two types of exclusionary reasons: directly motivational reasons and evidential ones. The concept has faced numerous criticisms, likely stemming from this particular focus. In this article, I emphasize another category of exclusionary reasons that Raz neglected: reasons that are excluded by their very nature. I argue that this category not only shows that the concept is not empty or inconsistent, but also plays a crucial role in elucidating a significant moral domain, specifically, the domain of affective relationships.
Source: Trans/Form/Ação
Author: Andrea Faggion
Institution: Universidade Estadual de Londrina
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4399499347