Motivating Public Sector Employees: Public Good Contributions in Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: We present a lab-in-the-field experiment with employees of the Addis Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority to understand how to improve coordination and collaboration in their daily work. Participants play a series of public good games under different rules: a standard game, a game with a threshold, and a game with a randomly selected anonymous monitor who has the power to punish. We show that a common goal, in the form of a threshold to be attained for the group’s success, is significantly more effective than a potentially punishing monitor for increasing individual effort and, ultimately, group outcomes (conditional on the threshold being attained). This result advocates for the introduction of team goals as coordination and motivation devices in settings where tasks are performed by groups and are subject to free riding and coordination challenges.
DOI: 10.1086/731967
Authors: George Joseph, Josepa Miquel-Florensa, Sanjay Pahuja, Yi Rong Hoo, Tewodros Tebekew
Institutions: World Bank, Toulouse School of Economics
Language: English
Subfield: Safety Research
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Agence Nationale de la Recherche
OpenAlex ID: W4400002356
