Work

Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty

Year: 2024

Type: preprint

Abstract: We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work, we consider the setting where voters express uncertain approval preferences and explore four different types of uncertain approval preference models. For each model, we study the problems such as computing a committee with the highest probability of satisfying axioms such as justified representation.

Source: ePrints Soton (University of Southampton)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2407.19391

Authors: Aziz, Hariz, Kagita, Venkateswara Rao, Rastegari, Baharak, Suzuki, Mashbat

Institutions: UNSW Sydney, National Institute of Technology Warangal, University of Southampton

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green