CoBA: Collusive Backdoor Attacks With Optimized Trigger to Federated Learning
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Considerable efforts have been devoted to addressing distributed backdoor attacks in federated learning (FL) systems. While significant progress has been made in enhancing the security of FL systems, our study reveals that there remains a false sense of security surrounding FL. We demonstrate that colluding malicious participants can effectively execute backdoor attacks during the FL training process, exhibiting high sparsity and stealthiness, which means they can evade common defense methods with only a few attack iterations. Our research highlights this vulnerability by proposing aCollusiveBackdoorAttack namedCoBA.CoBAis designed to enhance the sparsity and stealthiness of backdoor attacks by offering trigger tuning to facilitate learning of backdoor training data, controlling the bias of malicious local model updates, and applying the projected gradient descent technique. By conducting extensive empirical studies on 5 benchmark datasets, we make the following observations: 1)CoBAsuccessfully circumvents 15 state-of-the-art defense methods for robust FL; 2) Compared to existing backdoor attacks,CoBAconsistently achieves superior attack performance; and 3)CoBAcan achieve persistent poisoning effects through significantly sparse attack iterations. These findings raise substantial concerns regarding the integrity of FL and underscore the urgent need for heightened vigilance in defending against such attacks.
Institutions: Beijing Jiaotong University, Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique, Centre Inria de l'Université de Rennes, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Information Engineering, State Key Laboratory of Information Security, University of Notre Dame
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: green
Award: G1905834040
OpenAlex ID: W4401687264
