Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: An election with full turnout is supposed to achieve an outcome which perfectly reflects the majority’s preference. This result requires voters to be perfectly informed about their preference and to vote accordingly. I show that incentivizing participation through an abstention fine does not necessarily incentivize information acquisition. While a small abstention fine always increases information acquisition compared to Voluntary Voting, a high abstention fine that achieves full turnout increases information acquisition only if voting costs are high. If voting costs are low, the opposite is true: Less individuals acquire information under Compulsory Voting with full turnout than under Voluntary Voting.
Source: Games and Economic Behavior
Author: Linnéa Marie Rohde
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,540
OpenAlex ID: W4401733825