A note on the uniqueness of Nash–Cournot equilibria in an oligopolistic energy market with renewable generation and demand uncertainty
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: This work explores the uniqueness of Nash–Cournot equilibria in wholesale electricity markets with both thermal and renewable generation in the presence of demand uncertainty. Criteria guaranteeing a unique equilibrium are derived for an energy market where each firm owns a share of renewable generation. This work expands upon the uniqueness results proven by Lagerlöf (2006) to incorporate the presence of renewable generation into the market in the manner of Acemoglu et al. (2017). A numerical case study is used to illustrate the potential impacts of increasing renewable generation on equilibrium uniqueness and directions for future research are discussed.
Source: Energy Economics
Authors: Benjamin Chaiken, Joseph E. Duggan
Language: English
Subfield: Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,680
OpenAlex ID: W4401818113