Work

Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: We analyze a multi-period matching market where matching between agents is decided for each time period. To analyze this situation, we embed the situation into the framework of many-to-many matching with contracts where the contract includes the time period at which the matching occurs. While a general stability concept is already defined for the matching with contracts framework, in a multi-period matching model, a stable outcome may not exist when contracts exhibit complementarities across time periods. Thus, we define a weaker stability concept called temporal stability by taking into account the dynamic nature of the model. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a temporally stable outcome, including a corresponding substitutability condition, ordered substitutability, for the multi-period matching model.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.013

Authors: Keisuke Bando, Ryo Kawasaki

Institutions: Keio University, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,540