Ontologically grounding appearances in experience: Transcendental Idealism according to Anja Jauernig's The World According to Kant
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: In The World According to Kant Anja Jauernig defends a forthrightly idealist reading of Kant on which things in themselves exist independently of human minds while appearances (objects in space and time) are fully mind-dependent intentional objects of human experience.In these remarks I will concentrate more on our disagreements than on our agreements, as we philosophers typically do in these contexts.But let me say at the outset that I agree with a great deal of Jauernig's conclusions (having argued for similar ones myself) and I am pleased to see the resolutely idealist reading of Kant get such a full-throated and unapologetic defense.One of the merits of Jauernig's approach is that, by focusing on Kant's metaphysics and setting his epistemology to the side (deferred to a future book), she is able to address directly issues in the foundations of Kant's metaphysics that often go unexplored (e.g.whether appearances supervene on transcendental reality.)Without further ado, zu den Sachen selbst!Here is one of the central commitments of Kant's critical idealism, as interpreted by Jauernig: 1 TI1-Strong.(a) Empirical objects are not things in themselves in the transcendental sense, that is, they are not mind-independent; (b) rather empirical objects are Kantian outer appearances, that is, they are essentially intentional objects of outer experience as characterized in Kant's theory of experience, and thus, fully mind-dependent.(p.357) 21 Jauernig makes a distinction between critical and transcendental idealism which amounts, roughly, to the distinction between Kant's overall position (critical idealism), and one part of that position, the view that space, time, and empirical objects are transcendentally ideal.For simplicity, I will ignore that distinction in these comments (p.3-4).There are also distinctions between 'bold ' and 'timid' versions, as well as between 'strong' and 'weak,' that I ignore for the purpose of these comments.
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13100
Author: Nicholas Stang
Institution: University of Toronto
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,760
OpenAlex ID: W4402337006