How Auditors’ Client Service Affects Managers’ Cooperation with Auditor Evidence Requests
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Audit quality is threatened when client managers are uncooperative (i.e., slow to provide evidence or not forthcoming with evidence). Drawing on Social Exchange Theory, we examine whether auditors can increase client manager cooperation by providing better client service in their day-to-day interactions with client managers. For example, auditors can provide better client service by minimizing disruptions and communicating more effectively. Across two experiments with 114 experienced client managers, we find that managers experiencing better client service respond timelier to auditor requests and are more forthcoming with evidence, including evidence that contradicts their preferred accounting position. Our findings suggest that auditors can use client service strategically to increase access to important information, but anecdotal interviews with experienced auditors suggest that these strategic benefits are not at the forefront of auditors’ minds. Together, our study informs practice by illuminating strategic benefits of better client service and complements prior research emphasizing how client satisfaction objectives and strategies can benefit auditors commercially and when negotiating with clients.
Authors: Richard C. Hatfield, Kris Hoang, Michael Ricci, Edward Thomas
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4402389140