Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: In this article, my aim is to present panpsychism as a metaview in the philosophy of mind rather than as a position that can be juxtaposed with leading positions such as materialism and dualism.I argue here that proponents of some versions of dualism, dual-aspect theory, some non-standard forms of physicalism, or idealism may be guided by the assumptions of panpsychism as a meta-view.For example, the literature includes positions such as Chalmers' naturalistic dualism, Strawson's physicalist panpsychism, and Sprigge's idealist panpsychism, along with Nagel's remarks on dual-aspect theory.I argue that panpsychism, as a meta-view, provides a framework within which to analyze how these positions address the mind-body problem.Consequently, I conclude that the solution to the mindbody problem itself remains neutral toward these positions.Instead of focusing on the elaboration of these metaphysical positions, attention should be directed toward the crucial issue for panpsychism: the combination problem.
Source: Organon F
Author: Artur Kosecki
Institution: University of Szczecin
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4402394864