Work

Persuasion in veto bargaining

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We show that the proposer‐optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case, the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power. We discuss applications and how the optimal experiment can be implemented in practice.

Source: American Journal of Political Science

DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12914

Authors: Jenny S. Kim, Kyungmin Kim, Richard Van Weelden

Institutions: Emory University, University of Pittsburgh

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,900