Work

Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main contribution is an algorithm, based on the iterated deletion of unattractive alternatives ( Balinski and Ratier, 1997 ; Gutin et al., 2023 ), that determines if and when a given list of constraints is compatible with stability. Whenever there is a stable matching that satisfies the constraints, our algorithm outputs all of them (each in polynomial time per solution). This provides market designers with (i) a tool to test the feasibility of stable matchings subject to assignment constraints, and (ii) a tool to implement them when feasible.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.004

Authors: Gregory Z. Gutin, Philip R. Neary, Anders Yeo

Institutions: Royal Holloway University of London, University of Southern Denmark, University of Johannesburg

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,540

Funders: Universidade de Macau, Danmarks Frie Forskningsfond