Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: When accepting an axiomatic theory S, we are implicitly committed to various statements that are independent of its axioms. Examples of such implicit commitments include consistency statements and reflection principles for S. While foundational acceptance has received considerable attention in this context, the study of implicit commitments triggered by weaker notions remains underdeveloped. This article extends the analysis investigating implicit commitments inherent in instrumental acceptance, comparing them with the implicit commitments involved in foundational acceptance. Concentrating on Reinhardt’s instrumentalism vis-à-vis Kripke–Feferman theory of truth as a case study, we present a number of formal theories of acceptance motivated by Reinhardt’s program and we analyze their properties. We argue that, under reasonable assumptions, instrumental acceptance does entail non-trivial implicit commitments, yet weaker than those associated with foundational acceptance.
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqae108
Authors: Luca Castaldo, Maciej Głowacki
Institutions: University of Florence, University of Warsaw
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $4,279
Award: G735435112
OpenAlex ID: W4402686339