Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT A monopoly platform may prevent a startup which sells a complementary product from developing a competing platform by copying it. Imitation reduces the potential rival's profits from the new platform and thus its incentives to invest. The anticipation of the incumbent's aggressive behavior may also create an “ex ante” effect, by inducing the rival not to challenge the incumbent with a new platform (i.e., not to enter the “kill zone”) and to develop another (noncompeting) product instead. This finding is robust to several extensions.
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12614
Authors: Massimo Motta, Sandro Shelegia
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,090
Awards: G1096179202, G1175115578, G1267735876, G1287193361, G203129345, G2072863431, G210041235, G21928835, G2262748287, G2601397997, G2763833462, G300979063, G3419704271, G34346518, G3480869486, G3616382712, G3681454997, G4042783231, G425668148, G5080475149, G5195188938, Foundations for Antitrust and Policy on Digital Platforms, G7084143925, G7091948792, G8430294048, G869884560
OpenAlex ID: W4402731223