Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: We examine bureaucratic politics within the European Commission, using novel data on the backgrounds of individual members of Commissioners' cabinets. Although cabinet composition has become increasingly regulated in recent decades, its selection remains a key area for personalised political appointments within an organisation more commonly known for its collective responsibility and lack of individual influence. Using data on the personal and professional backgrounds of cabinet members since the first Barroso Commission, we trace how administrative reforms meant primarily to ‘de‐nationalise’ the selection of appointees have led to changes in cabinet composition. We then explore how cabinet composition impacts on the complexity of Commission proposals and its subsequent inter‐institutional negotiations. We find that whilst more diversity of Commission cabinets clearly enhances the input legitimacy of the EU's legislative process, it neither benefits nor threatens the quality of the Commission's policy proposals or how they are processed politically.
DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13678
Authors: William T. Daniel, Steffen Hurka
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,970
OpenAlex ID: W4402932807