Work

Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: In the context of voting, Moulin (1980) establishes that anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are often incompatible unless one accepts indecision (i.e. ties). We show that versions of this incompatibility continue to hold for a natural weakening of anonymity proposed by Bartholdi et al. (2021) called equity . As equity is a relatively weak fairness requirement, the tension between fairness and efficiency in voting is deeper than previously established.

Source: Journal of Mathematical Economics

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061

Author: Steven Kivinen

Institution: University of Graz

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,630