Work

Endogenous choice of environmental corporate social responsibility in a mixed duopoly

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: This paper constructs green managerial delegation contracts in a mixed duopoly wherein either or both public and private firms may adopt environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR). We demonstrate that the public (private) firm owner positively (negatively) adopts ECSR incentives under Cournot, whereas the incentives are reversed under Bertrand. We also examine an endogenous ECSR choice game and discover that unilateral ECSR adopted by a public firm appears under Cournot, whereas bilateral ECSR where both firms adopt ECSR incentives appears under Bertrand. Our findings show that coordination of competition mode may be harmful to society if both marginal damage and product substitutability are sufficiently high.

Source: International Journal of Economic Theory

DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12413

Authors: Lili Xu, Qinghong Zhao, Sang‐Ho Lee

Institutions: Dalian Maritime University, Chonnam National University

Language: English

Topic: Merger and Competition Analysis

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,200

Funders: National Natural Science Foundation of China, National Research Foundation of Korea