Work

Competition for publication-based rewards

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: This paper studies how more competition among researchers for publication-based rewards affects the quality of the publication process. Publishable results can be generated via costly informative sequential private experimentation or costly uninformative manipulation. By reducing expected rewards, competition may discourage manipulation in favor of experimentation, but not vice versa. It also reduces excessive experimentation. Both effects improve the quality of the publication process.

Source: Economics Letters

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112017

Author: Mike Felgenhauer

Institution: Brunel University of London

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,980

OpenAlex ID: W4403154582

FWCI:

Cites: 6

Cited by:

Related to: 10