Work

StackGuard+$\text{StackGuard}^+$: Interoperable alternative to canary‐based protection of stack smashing

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: This paper introduces a novel software‐based approach to enhancing stack smashing protection in C/C++ applications, specifically targeting return‐oriented programming attacks, which remain a significant threat to firmware and software security. Traditional canary‐based protections are vulnerable to brute‐force and format string attacks. Additionally, many stack protection mechanisms require access to the source code or recompilation, complicating the security of existing binaries. This paper proposes a new method, aptly named , that modifies the canary‐based protection mechanism by altering the code responsible for canary insertion and verification. This change ensures the integrity of the return address while maintaining the original code size, allowing for seamless interoperability without the need for recompilation or additional hardware. The approach can be automated using a Python script, which modifies existing canary‐based binaries with only 26 bytes of machine code on the 86‐64 platform. Moreover, this approach can be easily adapted to other platforms, including 86 and ARM64.

Source: Electronics Letters

DOI: 10.1049/ell2.13310

Authors: Kangmin Kim, Jeong‐Nyeo Kim, Seungkwang Lee

Institutions: Dankook University, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute

Language: English

Topic: Security and Verification in Computing

Subfield: Artificial Intelligence

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $2,540

Funder: Defense Acquisition Program Administration