Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Cooperation on environmental issues is often perceived as a zero-sum game, where individual gains must be sacrificed for collective benefits. This paper offers a the oretical solution that balances individual and collective benefits to foster joint environmental action. Drawing on game theory and insights from the inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) literature, the paper explores how to solve environmental problems that present a collective action dilemma. It aligns with proponents of gain framing for environmental action and introduces the concept of ‘exogenous personalised gains’ in driving environmental action. It demonstrates that if the right exogenous personalised gains are leveraged, joint environmental actions are more likely.
Author: Victor Osei Kwadwo
Language: English
Subfield: Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
Field: Environmental Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4403291913