Work

Research on Joint Fraudulence of Supply Chain Financing Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Year: 2024

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: In order to solve the problem of financing difficulties of SMEs, this paper takes the inventory pledge in supply chain finance as the research object, constructs a three-party participatory evolutionary game model with banks, SMEs, and logistics enterprises as the main game bodies, and considers the impact of fraudulent collateralization of SMEs and joint fraudulent loan behavior of logistics enterprises on the evolutionary development. It is found that the cost of fraudulent collateralization of SMEs and their own investment reproduction rate of return, the share ratio of joint fraudulent financing amount of SMEs and the positive and negative feedback effect of the business environment on the behavior of the enterprises play a key role in promoting the evolutionary development to the ideal stable point, and relevant conclusions are drawn accordingly.

Source: International Conference on Information Management and Management Science (IMMS)

DOI: 10.1145/3695652.3695708

Authors: JingXian Liu, Jing Huang, Nan Gao

Institution: University of Shanghai for Science and Technology

Language: English

Topic: Supply Chain and Inventory Management

Subfield: Management Information Systems

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Funder: National Natural Science Foundation of China

OpenAlex ID: W4403413286

FWCI:

Cites: 11

Cited by:

Related to: 10