Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Empirical Bayes-based Methods (EBM) is an increasingly popular form of Objective Bayesianism (OB). It is identified in particular with the statistician Bradley Efron. The main aims of this paper are, first, to describe and illustrate its main features and, second, to locate its role by comparing it with two other statistical paradigms, Subjective Bayesianism (SB) and Evidentialism. EBM’s main formal features are illustrated in some detail by schematic examples. The comparison between what Efron calls their underlying “philosophies” is by way of a distinction made between confirmation and evidence. Although this distinction is sometimes made in the statistical literature, it is relatively rare and never to the same point as here. That is, the distinction is invariably spelled out intra- and not inter-paradigmatically solely in terms of one or the other accounts. The distinction made in this paper between confirmation and evidence is illustrated by two well-known statistical paradoxes: the base-rate fallacy and Popper’s paradox of ideal evidence. The general conclusion reached is that each of the paradigms has a basic role to play and all are required by an adequate account of statistical inference from a technically informed and fine-grained philosophical perspective.
Source: Entropy
DOI: 10.3390/e26100859
Institution: Montana State University
Language: English
Subfield: Statistics and Probability
Field: Mathematics
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,955
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W4403452794