Democratic Stability and Backsliding
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: In light of mounting concerns about democratic backsliding, Rawls’s work – which has an unusual focus on considerations of stability – is now being mined for insights about democratic fragility. This paper begins by arguing that the key mechanism underlying Rawls’s account of stability cannot, consistent with a proper recognition of the burdens of judgment, explain what makes democratic stability possible. It is, therefore, not well-positioned to help us to think productively about how to mitigate the risk of backsliding. Building on an influential literature in political science, I describe an alternative way of thinking about what enables democratic stability that focuses on the importance of giving key actors self-interested reasons for compliance. This account provides a more productive framework for understanding the causes, and thinking about how to mitigate the risk, of backsliding. It should, therefore, contribute to how we evaluate political institutions and proposed reforms.
Source: Political Philosophy
DOI: 10.16995/pp.17029
Author: Ryan Pevnick
Institution: New York University
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4403503076