Work

Moral judgment is sensitive to bargaining power.

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: = 3,025; U.S.-based Prolific participants). We construct scenarios depicting everyday social interactions between two parties in which one of them can perform a mutually beneficial but unpleasant action. We find that the same actions (asking the other to perform the unpleasant action or explicitly refusing to do it) are perceived as less morally appropriate when performed by the party with lower bargaining power, as compared to the party with higher bargaining power. In other words, participants tend to give more moral leeway to parties with better bargaining positions and to hold disadvantaged parties to stricter moral standards. This effect appears to depend only on the relative bargaining power of each party but not on the magnitude of the bargaining power asymmetry between them. We discuss implications for contractualist theories of moral cognition and the emergence and persistence of unfair norms and inequality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

Source: Journal of Experimental Psychology General

DOI: 10.1037/xge0001678

Authors: Arthur Le Pargneux, Fiery Cushman

Institutions: University of Warwick, Harvard University

Language: English

Topic: Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience

Field: Neuroscience

Domain: Life Sciences

SDGs: Reduced inequalities, Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Funders: Harvard University, University of Warwick, Economic and Social Research Council, Office of Naval Research