Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: A few years ago Hong et al. (Quantum Inf Process 16:236, 2017) proposed a quantum identity authentication protocol using single photons and executable on currently available quantum hardware. Zawadzki later published two attacks on this protocol, and suggested a mitigation in the same work. In this comment we point out an additional vulnerability that causes the prover Alice to leak a percentage of her secret key at every authentication attempt. The latter is due to a problematic policy in the generation and management of decoy states. We conclude by showing a simple mitigation that addresses the issue.
Source: Quantum Information Processing
Authors: Davide Li Calsi, Paul Kohl
Institution: Technical University of Munich
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,790
Funder: Technische Universität München
OpenAlex ID: W4403567491