Work

Uniform Price Auction with Quantity Constraints

Year: 2026

Type: article

Abstract: We study the equilibria of uniform price auctions where many asymmetric bidders have flat demands up to their respective quantity constraints. We present an iterative procedure that systematically finds an equilibrium outcome as well as an ascending auction that has this outcome as a dominant strategy equilibrium outcome. Demand reduction and low price equilibrium may occur since it is advantageous for a bidder to give up some of his/her demand and get the remaining demand at a low price rather than to get his/her entire demand at a higher price. We show that a low price equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium when no bidder’s quantity constraint is large enough to cover the supply.

Source: The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2025-0074

Author: Kiho Yoon

Institution: Korea University

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,712

Funders: National Research Foundation, Korea University, National Research Foundation of Korea