Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: About 30 years ago, the Dynamical Hypothesis instigated a variety of insights and transformations in cognitive science. One of them was the simple observation that, quite unlike trial-based tasks in a laboratory, natural ecologically valid behaviors almost never have context-free starting points. Instead, they produce lengthy time series data that can be recorded with dense-sampling measures, such as heartrate, eye movements, EEG, etc. That emphasis on studying the temporal dynamics of extended behaviors may have been the trigger that led to a rethinking of what a "representation" is, and then of what a "cognitive agent" is. This most recent and perhaps most revolutionary transformation is the idea that a cognitive agent need not be a singular physiological organism. Perhaps a group of organisms, such as several people working on a joint task, can temporarily function as one cognitive agent - at least while they're working adaptively and successfully.
Source: Topics in Cognitive Science
DOI: 10.1111/tops.12763
Author: Michael J. Spivey
Institution: University of California, Merced
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,300
OpenAlex ID: W4403716533