Work

Counter-Screen – A No-Hardware Method to Prevent Eavesdropping of Video Using TMDS

Year: 2024

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: TEMPEST, a form of electronic eavesdropping, poses significant risks to sensitive information transmitted through High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) and Digital Visual Interface - Digital (DVI-D) connections. This paper investigates a novel technique to mitigate TEMPEST attacks by manipulating Transition Minimized Differential Signaling (TMDS) values. By introducing a secondary screen that displays TMDS values with opposite transition characteristics, the emitted electromagnetic interference (EMI) can be countered, thereby concealing information from potential eavesdroppers. This paper details the implementation of this method, provides experimental validation, and discusses the potential benefits and implications of this approach.

Source: International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility - EMC Europe (EMC Europe)

DOI: 10.1109/emceurope59828.2024.10722124

Authors: Ryan Groot, Duncan Van Meeteren, Frank Leferink

Institution: Thales (Netherlands)

Language: English

Topic: Security and Verification in Computing

Subfield: Artificial Intelligence

Field: Computer Science

Domain: Physical Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W4403760495

FWCI:

Cites: 8

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Related to: 10