Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Contemporary scholars working in virtue epistemology profess to take inspiration and build on the ancient Greek conception of intellectual virtues. In this paper, I show that, despite their claim, contemporary models of intellectual virtue differ in notable ways from the ancient Greek account of the concept. I pinpoint two major differences between the ancient Greek conception of intellectual virtues and the contemporary understandings of the term. These amount to (a) what the term of intellectual virtues includes and (b) the location of the value of intellectual virtues. I argue that re‐examining the philosophical history of the concept of intellectual virtue can have significant positive implications for contemporary virtue epistemology. Indicatively, I show that it could lead to the development of theories that maintain that intellectual excellences are conducive to leading a good life because their activity is constitutive of the human good—instead of locating their value, as contemporary virtue epistemologists currently do, in the epistemic goods that they enable the agent to acquire and/or in the agent's epistemic motivations.
Source: Theoria
DOI: 10.1111/theo.12575
Author: Alkis Kotsonis
Institutions: The American College of Greece, University of Glasgow
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4403777417