Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Boris Kment formulates two challenges to anti-haecceitism: one based on the concept of chance, and the other involving counterfactuals. In this paper I refute the chance-based argument by appropriately reformulating its premises in a non-individualistic language. Regarding the argument from counterfactuals I consider three strategies of defense. The strategy that is ultimately accepted as most promising is a revamped approach based on the distinction between possible worlds and possibilities. I counter Kment’s claim that the introduction of fine-grained possibilities within possible worlds is haecceitism in disguise. My conclusion is that anti-haecceitism survives the criticism, and is an overall more attractive position than its competitor.
Source: Erkenntnis
Author: Tomasz Bigaj
Institution: University of Warsaw
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,990
Funder: Narodowe Centrum Nauki
Award: G1997256191
OpenAlex ID: W4403793260