Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty metatheory brings with it expressive deficiencies, we highlight here another complication arising from the use of a glutty metatheory, this time evidential in nature. According to this countermodel problem, while the thoroughgoing dialetheist who embraces a glutty metatheory can justify their acceptance of a rule of inference's invalidity using countermodels, to justify their renunciation of an unwanted rule they actually require the means to warrant their rejection of the rule's validity—which cannot be supplied by countermodels based on a standard dialetheic semantics. We end by sketching out a possible solution for the thoroughgoing dialetheist using a bilaterialist semantics.
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13130
Authors: Andreas Fjellstad, Ben Martin
Institution: University of Padua
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,760
Funder: European Commission
OpenAlex ID: W4403802139